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ABSTRACT

This report on correctional supervision of juvenile offenders begins by identifying two principal factors affecting supervision--facility overcrowding and a declining number of offenders expected because of demographic trends. It notes that overcrowding eventually will be alleviated by the decrease in the number of offenders, and that this situation calls for finding noncapital-intensive supervisory alternatives and also provides an opportunity to experiment with alternatives to secure confinement. The goals of supervision are listed and explained. Strategies for exploring or promoting those types of supervisory programs that currently appear to hold the most promise are identified and discussed. The focus is on supervisory programs of: (1) outreach and tracking; (2) nine-to-five community programming; (3) group and foster homes and therapeutic communities; and (4) secure residential facilities. A detailed argument and design for an aftercare experiment is appended. (NB)

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CORRECTIONAL SUPERVISION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Peter W. Greenwood

December 1986

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PREFACE

This paper was prepared for a program planning conference sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and held in Annapolis, Maryland in December 1986.

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CORRECTIONAL SUPERVISION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

A Discussion Paper
Prepared by
Peter W. Greenwood
for

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's
Program Planning Workshop

Annapolis, Maryland
December 10-11, 1986

INTRODUCTION

Supervision: the action, process, or occupation of supervising: a critical watching and directing (as of activities or a course of action); for synonym see oversight

Oversight: watchful and responsible care.[1]

When you think about it, we use the term "supervision" in the juvenile justice system to mean everything that the same term covers in the criminal justice system plus all the responsibilities of parenting. In the juvenile justice context supervision includes making sure that the criminal is kept under control and also seeing that the welfare and future interests of the minor are looked after--a heavy load indeed.

Any discussion of post-adjudicatory supervision issues must take into account the policy context in which they are to be considered. The two principal factors that will influence all such discussions during the next five years are *Facility Overcrowding and Declining Numbers of Offenders*. Facilities are now and will remain overcrowded because of:

1. Spillover effects from overcrowding of adult facilities, which results in fewer waivers to adult court, loss of facilities to adult agencies, and usurpation of capital building funds for adult construction; and

[1] *Websters New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1975.

2. A general "get tough" attitude toward chronic and serious juvenile offenders, as evidenced by the formation in many jurisdictions of special juvenile career criminal prosecution units, mandatory minimum terms for commitments to state training schools, and much longer terms being set by juvenile offender parole boards.

The number of juvenile offenders, and juvenile crime, has declined and will continue that path, not because of any particular government policies but because of favorable demographic trends. As the baby boom ages, our population is shifting toward a higher proportion of low crime rate adults and a lower proportion of high crime rate juveniles. Remember, age specific arrest rates peak at ages 16-18 and at age 24 are only one-fourth as high as they are at the peak teenage years. The aging of our population is the best crime reduction strategy that anyone has been able to come up with.

So what? you may ask. What do these two pieces of trivia have to do with supervision? First, the temporary overcrowding that will eventually (five to ten years) be alleviated by favorable demographic trends calls for finding noncapital-intensive supervisory alternatives. You don't want to build facilities that will not be needed by the time that construction is completed.

Second, the current overcrowding provides an opportunity to experiment with real supervisory alternatives to traditional secure confinement. Although terms for chronic juvenile offenders are getting longer, there is still no strong public consensus that all juvenile offenders need to be locked up, in the way that public attitudes have hardened toward adult offenders. The system can still take risks with juveniles that it cannot with adults. This means that any really meaningful experimentation with real alternatives to secure confinement *must* occur in the juvenile system.

A third factor that makes this time particularly propitious for experimentation with non-traditional alternatives is the abundance of new players just beginning to enter the social-service delivery market. Haven't you noticed those ads for the new proprietary drug and alcohol

treatment facilities that claim to achieve spectacular results? And what about those special in-patient hospital programs for adolescent drug abusers and behavioral problems that mom and dad's health insurance will pay up to $300 a day for? There are a lot of new treatment technologies around that were not yet developed during the last wave of juvenile treatment experimentation during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Finally, a fourth factor, which may give further impetus to the search for more effective treatment methodologies and delivery systems, is the growing body of longitudinal research showing a strong causal connection between the severity of later criminality, particularly crimes of violence, and early deprivation and victimization of the child. Intensive case studies of most violent or chronic juvenile offenders reveal consistent patterns of severe neglect and abuse during their early childhood.

All of these factors combine to create a policy climate that is ripe for experimentation. Recent experience with the VJO (Violent Juvenile Offender) Evaluation, The National Council on Crime and Delinquency's Utah Study, and our own Private Sector Evaluation suggest that practitioners are also hungry for new answers and willing to cooperate with the requirements of experimental evaluations.

For purposes of exposition we will group the various forms of supervision to be considered into the following four primary categories:

Tracking and outreach, which include any efforts by some supervisory agency to monitor or supervise the activities of a youth who is not in their custody but free in the community.

9-to-5 programming, which includes such programs as the Associated Marine Institutes' (AMI) Dade Marine Institute in which assigned youth are picked up at their homes each morning, participate in activities run by the program all day, and are returned to their homes at night.

Group homes, foster homes, and therapeutic communities, which are all usually community based, non-secure and require the willing participation of the assigned youth.

Secure residential programs, which run the gamut from very secure state training schools exceeding 1600 beds to wilderness camps and wagon trains in which security is provided by the staff and the isolation of the setting.

Basically the story is that we don't know what works at all, let alone what works best for particular types of kids. The Murray and Cox (1979) Unified Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS) results and the recent NCCD (National Council on Crime and Delinquency) evaluation of programs in Utah suggest that some form of residential placement or community programming is superior to simple probation supervision for chronic offenders, whether the latter is deemed intensive or not. Research is needed to tell judges and other officials responsible for placement decisions the probable consequences of different types of placements for different types of youths.

On the action side, policy leadership is needed to eliminate artificial barriers that restrict the quality and number of placement options available to the court by increasing the maximum rates that most states allow to be paid for group and foster home placements and simplifying the procedures by which new programs and facilities are licensed.

Most states now have an oversupply of chronically delinquent youth requiring residential placement and an undersupply of suitable programs. As a result, many training schools and detention centers are bulging at their seams with youths they cannot adequately house, let alone effectively program. In many states the entire network of juvenile residential facilities is being overwhelmed by spillover effects from their overcrowded adult systems and an absence of effective programs at the community level. In many jurisdictions, referring a youngster to detention or DYS (Department of Youth Services) is the only way of insuring he or she will get the services and supervision so desperately required.

This paper will focus on strategies for exploring or promoting those types of supervisory programs that currently appear to hold the most promise. This judgment is based on recent observations of programs in the field and discussions with practitioners as well as reported research results, which tend to lag several years behind professional judgment.

WHAT IS SUPERVISION SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH?

Twenty years ago there would have been no question about the goal: Look out for the welfare of the minor. Supervision meant parenting. Nowadays the first thing many people think of when we mention supervising chronic juvenile offenders is: Keeping them from doing any more crimes--against each other or the public at large.

Clearly, the goals of supervision include:

- Restricting future criminal activities.
- Regulating activities and behavior.
- Restricting negative influences (peers, media, activities, etc.).
- Altering attitudes and behavior patterns.
- Provision of suitable care.
- Encouragement of pro-social activities (school attendance, recreation, etc.).

We expect "supervision" to result in an immediate cessation of criminal and other anti-social activity (use of drugs and alcohol, promiscuous sex, truancy, etc.) and the reestablishment or initiation of more positive behavioral patterns that we associate with pro-social development. Supervision, in addition to reducing criminal activity, should lead to: increased school attendance, better grades, less association with delinquent peers, less family strife, and a reduction in what Stanton Samenow in *The Criminal Personality* calls "criminal thinking"--thought processes that justify victimizing or manipulating others. Supervision of juveniles is different from supervision of adults in that the juvenile is not yet assumed to be fully responsible for his or her own care or actions. They are still assumed to be in need of guidance from a responsible adult.

ARE MOST OF THESE GOALS POSSIBLE OR JUST WISHFUL THINKING?

One of the most widely accepted and influential findings to come out of criminal justice research during the past two decades has been the conclusion that rehabilitative programs do not work. The reports that got the most attention were those by Martinson (1974) and Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks (1975). But several preceding reports (Bailey, 1966; Adams, 1975) and several that came after (Sechrest, White, and Brown, 1979; Martin, Sechrest, and Redner, 1981) all came to the same conclusions:

> With few and isolated experiences, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism (Martinson, 1974).
>
> Within the limits noted below, the Panel concludes that Martinson and his associates were essentially correct. There is no body of evidence for any treatment or intervention with criminal offenders that can be relied upon to produce a decrease in recidivism. Where there are suggestions they are just that--suggestions. They prove to be elusive, not replicable, not quite statistically significant, working now only with one group, then only with another (Sechrest, White, and Brown, 1979, p. 31).

No wonder enthusiasm for rehabilitative efforts has declined. Is there any reason other than blind faith to keep looking for effective rehabilitative programs? This section is based on the presumption that there is.

Overreliance on punishment or incapacitation are not cure-alls either. Both are expensive. Both result in large prison populations consisting largely of underprivileged and minority young men. And neither by itself can have more than a modest effect on crime rates because most punished offenders are quickly returned to the streets (Greenwood and Abrahamse, 1982).

The correctional evaluation literature is not all that great. The evidence is nowhere near compelling enough to warrant scuttling the entire concept. If we were to concede that treatment programs had no beneficial effects, this concession would be disastrous to juvenile justice programs. Rehabilitative considerations would no longer be

valid criteria for placement decisions; punishment and incapacitation would become the principal objective of sentencing as they are in the adult system today. The mission of those who work in juvenile programs would shift from change agent or facilitator to custodian and guard. The current high rate of recidivism for juveniles committed to institutional care would guarantee a continuing large supply of career criminals for the adult system to deal with (Greenwood et al., 1983).

As long as there is a federal agency concerned with juvenile delinquency, or juvenile justice, one of its primary concerns must be to continue looking for more effective methods of reducing persistent criminal behavior among the young.

There are several reasons why the reviewers of the evaluation literature we quoted above came to their discouraging conclusions. One reason they all cited was the low quality of most of the evaluation studies they had to work with. Many had inadequate research designs for measuring the success of experimental programs compared with the traditional programs they were designed to replace. Most failed to measure or describe the extent to which the experimental program was actually implemented, or the intensity of the treatment received by individual youths. Another reason for their negative conclusions was that many of the programs described in the literature appeared to be simplistic. However, the primary reason was not because of the evidence they found but how they chose to interpret it.

The conclusion that "treatment does not work" is based on a particular classification or typology of programs that is theory based. Programs are classified according to what are thought to be their primary method of treatment. Group counseling is different from vocational training, which is different in turn from behavior modification, even though the amount of time devoted to these activities may account for less than 5 percent of the participating offender's time. When researchers say that none of these treatment methods work what they mean is that the programs they have studied that fall within the particular treatment category did not consistently produce results better than other types of treatments (the controls), even though one or two may have. In other words, treatment or intervention methods are said not to work unless they consistently produce superior results, no

matter how they are applied or with what they are compared. This may be an unrealistic test for them to pass. It is akin to arbitrarily focusing on one particular characteristic of business organizations, such as their organizational form, personnel practices, or marketing scheme, and attempting to determine whether any one particular approach is consistently better than all the others observed. When all the results were in, one would be hard pressed to convince business executives that organization, personnel, and marketing plans had no effect on their results, no matter what the analysis showed.

This method of evaluation turns out to be a test of the hypothesis that one particular variable, which we happen to call treatment method, dominates all of the others (types of staff, training, management skills, screening and selection of participants, etc.) that might be used to define a program. Rejection of this hypothesis simply means that no such dominance exists. Variables other than those we now use to define treatment methods must also be important in determining outcomes.

The public official who wants to establish an effective juvenile offender treatment program is in exactly the same situation as any business executive who wants to start a new and presumably profitable business. Theories about rehabilitation or making money from businesses tend to be rather general. To do better than average one must have a certain amount of luck or skill in finding the appropriate combination of management, staff, and operating concepts to produce the desired results.

The ultimate test of any rehabilitation program is not what technique it uses, or where it takes place, or how hard it tries, or how well people like it--the characteristics that are normally used to describe a "model" program. The ultimate test is its effect on youths after they leave the program--primarily, its effects on their criminal behavior. This may seem an obvious point, but it is ignored more often than it is recognized in the treatment literature. The model programs proposed in the literature are not usually supported by evidence that they lead to lower recidivism rates. Correctional agencies seldom collect the kinds of data that can show whether their current expenditures on testing, diagnosis, classification, and programming lead to lower recidivism rates.

There are several different kinds of evidence suggesting that rehabilitative efforts may not be as consistently unproductive as the current wisdom holds. One source of evidence is those exceptional cases in the body of evaluative studies from which the "nothing works" conclusions are drawn. For instance Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks (1975) reported:

> The failure rate for all boys participating in the Outward Bound School was lower (20 percent) than the expected rate for delinquents in the same age category institutionalized in Massachusetts (35 percent). (p. 251.)
>
> But the recidivism rate of all the treated boys (in a program of individual psychotherapy within the Boy's Industrial School in Ohio) was significantly lower than the recidivism rate for the entire institutional population. (p. 208.)
>
> The results obtained during a three-to-five year follow-up clearly indicate that the experimental subjects (provided with sociopsychologically oriented supportive counseling combined with comprehensive welfare measures) recidivated in significantly smaller proportions (41 versus 58 percent). (p. 173.)
>
> There is evidence that vocationally oriented training programs for youthful offenders both in institutions and in the community are associated with lower rates of recidivism than standard institutional care. (p. 423.)
>
> In general individual psychotherapy is more likely to be effective when it is enthusiastically administered to youthful (16 to 20) amendable offenders by interested and concerned therapists with a pragmatic orientation. (p. 525.)

Hawkins and Zimring (1986) suggest that between 1925 and 1939 the English Borstals achieved an exceptionally low rate of recidivism for their youthful charges. A second source of optimism is provided by those judges, correctional caseworkers, and researchers (Armstrong and Altschuler, 1982; McKenzie, 1981; Woods, 1982) who are beginning to identify programs, largely in the private sector, that they perceive to be more effective than traditional training schools in reducing recidivism rates. Occasionally, for example in Florida, this perception is backed by comparative data on recidivism rates, but there is nothing as rigorous as a controlled experiment.

A third source of evidence is provided by recent findings concerning the effectiveness of public schools in improving the academic achievement of children from lower income families. As is currently the case with rehabilitation, during the 1970s education researchers concluded that schools "didn't matter," that no particular instructional techniques could be found that were consistently effective in improving the performance of poor children. Academic performance was thought to be determined primarily by the background characteristics of children and not be the academic programs to which they were exposed or the performance of their school (Averch et al., 1972; Coleman et al., 1966; Jencks, 1972). As is also the case with rehabilitation this pessimistic conclusion was based on a large number of evaluative studies that failed to find any consistent "treatment" effects, as treatments were then being defined; namely particular instructional packages, methods, or classroom management techniques.

A few education researchers believed that the accuracy of the "nothing matters" conclusion was challenged by the existence of some "instructionally effective" schools in which poor children showed much larger gains in academic achievement than would be predicted from their background characteristics. On further study these schools were found to exhibit characteristics that set them apart from their less effective peers (Edmonds and Frederiksen, 1978; Rutter et al., 1979; Weber, 1971):[2]

- Continuing instructional leadership and support for teachers from principals.
- High expectations for student performance.
- The development of an integrated curriculum that emphasizes academic skills.
- Frequent monitoring of student progress.

[2]The evidence in support of the "instructionally effective schools" notion is still rather thin and subject to varying interpretations. See Ralph and Fennessey (1983) for a critique of the literature.

- An orderly and quiet but not oppressive atmosphere.
- Maximization of time on academic activities.
- Collaborative planning and collegial relationships among teachers.
- School-wide staff development and recognition of academic success.
- Techniques for minimizing turnover among the most competent staff.

Although these characteristics may seem obvious or commonplace, they are also apparently the meat-and-potatoes issues on which effective instructional programs are based, and they are frequently neglected ingredients in inner-city schools. Whether or not these particular ingredients turn out to be important determinants of school effectiveness, the point is that there appear to be many more important ingredients than the curriculum design and classroom organization variables that have dominated the education evaluation literature for the past several years (Goodlad, 1984).

As people have begun to examine the characteristics of delinquency treatment programs with reputations for effectiveness, they are finding characteristics similar to those that distinguish effective schools.

In addition to this meager, but we believe encouraging, evidence we must rely on our own perceptions. Based on our review of the literature and on our own observations and interviews with delinquent youth, we are well aware of the social and emotional deficits from which many of these youth suffer. In retrospect it becomes clear that many of the experimental programs developed and tested during the past two decades failed to address the full array of problems confronting these youth in a realistic manner. In many instances the treatment programs were too narrowly focused or too brief in duration. There are good reasons why many of these programs failed and therefore good reasons to believe that not all future programs must fail.

OUTREACH AND TRACKING

Most juvenile arrests do not result in any court appearance at all, let alone imposition of supervisory conditions. First, second, and even third-time offenders are usually "counseled and released" or "station house adjusted." It takes real clout to make it to court.

For those juveniles who do finally make it to court on their fourth, fifth, or later referral, the prognosis is already less than favorable. After a fifth arrest the probability of another exceeds 75 percent. Among all those male juveniles with five or more arrests, 75 percent will be arrested 5 or more times as an adult (Blumstein et al., 1986).

For those juveniles who do make it to court, "home on probation" (HOP) is the disposition recommended and imposed in the majority of cases. Although caseloads and supervisory methods may vary from one site to the next, HOP generally means nominal "supervision" by a caseworker who is carrying 50 to 100 other cases, which translates into an introductory meeting ("You do all right by me and I'll do all right by you") followed by a series of perfunctory monthly phone calls (How's it going--great--give me a call if you have any problems"), the supervisory equivalent of "take two aspirins and call me in the morning." If nothing more is required then this will do the trick. Usually more is required and it is the kid who does the trick. A recent evaluation of alternative levels of probation supervision in Utah showed that there was no difference in recidivism rates between juveniles who received (1) no supervision, (2) routine supervision, or (3) twice the level of routine supervision (Krisberg, Austin, and Joe, 1986). Yes there was random assignment among these three conditions and sample sizes were adequate to detect policy relevant differences. The supervisory activity that some cynics call the "$400 dollar phone call" appears to be a flop.

Of course everything we say about routine probation also applies to routine forms of parole supervision for youths following a residential placement. Most graduates of state training schools receive this same level of supervision following their 6 to 18 month stay in secure confinement. When combined with inadequate planning and programming of

post-release activities, this cursory supervision works no better for parolees than it does for probationers.

The alternative to routine probation and parole that is being tried in several locations is what Massachusetts calls Outreach and Tracking. Massachusetts DYS (Department of Youth Services) buys O and T slots from private vendors, which they then use as initial placements, or for supervising juveniles after their release from a residential program. The courts even use some O and T slots for diversion.

These programs use recent college graduates or ex-offenders to keep close tabs on the youth. Caseloads are kept around seven or eight and face-to-face contacts exceed four times a week. Supervision of caseworkers is close and continuous, and some programs include a clinical psychologist as part of the supervisory team. These Tracking and Outreach programs cost between $7,000 and $10,000 per slot per year and youth are assigned to them for periods exceeding six months.

Outreach and Tracking slots are appropriate for youth who can function and receive all the services they need in the community and who have a suitable place to live. Outreach and Tracking makes sure they continue moving in the right direction or yanks them back into custody when it becomes clear that they will not. A recent study of Massachusetts DYS recidivism rates found that 49 percent of their releasees had not been arrested one year after their release, a success rate that most states cannot come close to matching.

In Dade County this close supervision is called the Master Counseler Program. By whatever name, the goal is the same: Act as surrogate family without removing the juvenile from his home. We need to know more about the effectiveness of such programs and the critical ingredients it takes to make them work: Type of kid; length of supervision; maximum caseload; type of caseworker. The appendix to this paper contains a proposal for evaluating Outreach and Tracking in the context of *Aftercare* following residential placements. It could just as easily be used as an initial placement option. More about *Aftercare* following our discussion of residential programs.

NINE-TO-FIVE COMMUNITY PROGRAMMING

What do you do after you send a kid home on probation and he continues to skip school and hang out with his old buddies? Lock him up? Even if he has a decent home to stay in and parents who are reasonably cooperative?

Many cities in Florida and other nearby states now have an intermediate option; a local marine institute run by AMI (Associated Marine Institutes). These programs accept court committed youth on a daily basis. The juveniles either come on their own or are picked up at their homes each morning and brought to the program site. In Dade County the site for DMI is a complex of temporary classrooms, shops and dock facilities adjacent to the SeaAquarium on the Rickenbacker Causeway. During the day the youths attend remedial education classes on the site, receive training in SCUBA techniques, help in maintaining the site and its equipment, and occasionally participate in overnight diving expeditions or extended work projects. The programs are a combination of "continuation school" and "job corps" with a marine focus.

A recent evaluation of program recidivism rates by the State Attorney (prosecutor) for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Merceret, 1986) concluded, "The program at Dade Marine Institute (DMI) appears to have the highest proportion of successes." Across all programs, only 26 percent of the subjects studied avoided another referral within 24 months of their release. Among DMI graduates the success rate was 48 percent.

The local 9 to 5 institute concept is clearly most appropriate where the youth has a satisfactory living arrangement but is not motivated to participate in traditional education or vocational training activities on his own, or is a source of chronic behavioral problems when he does. The special attention and additional resources that are made available through the Institute, over and above what are available in a regular classroom, are apparently enough to get many youngsters back on track at far less cost than would be required for a residential placement.

Most jurisdictions do not have such programs available to them, other than those run by the local school district. Their absence is most probably due to the perverse financial incentives that provide free "state funded" care to youth committed to training schools but not a dime of state "subsidy" for kids who are committed to local programs. In Florida local programs like DMI are also state supported and besides, AMI is able to do a little charitable fund raising on its own. Each local institute has its own Board of local movers and shakers.

What is needed in the 9 to 5 program area is more examples and evaluations of good programs and more attention to the funding formulas that discriminate against less expensive, and possibly more effective, local programs in favor of residential programs (i.e. training schools) run by the state.

GROUP AND FOSTER HOMES AND THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES

Picture six formerly chronic delinquent male teenagers living in a four bedroom suburban home under the supervision of several caseworkers, a special education teacher, and a consulting clinical psychologist. Would you like them next door to you? Would you like to try and run such a home in return for $2,400 per month per kid, out of which you have to feed and clothe the youths and pay for the house in addition to providing education and 24-hour supervision? How would you like to try and start such a home including paying for the empty building during the year or more it takes to get it licensed as a group home by the state?

Barry Nidorf, Chief Probation Officer of Los Angeles County, has stated unequivocally that his department could use an additional 1000 juvenile community beds.

Guess what folks? What we have here is a basic failure to communicate, in market terms. Raise the price or ease the restrictions on market entry and the beds will be there. The problem is that Barry Nidorf controls neither. The Rate Board in Sacramento sets the price and the Department of Social Services sets the requirements. Neither of them have an overcrowding problem to deal with.

What we are now beginning to see is many metropolitan areas exporting their delinquent youth to programs in rural areas where the state set per diem rates allow a reasonable standard of living. California judges are sending their kids to VisionQuest in Arizona and Rites of Passage in Nevada. The Sunday *Los Angeles Times* is filled with ads for disciplinary schools in Utah where concerned parents can be sure their budding "surf bums" and "valley girls" will rediscover hard work and self-discipline as the righteous path to social advancement.

What we need here is a serious study of the funding and licensing issues with an aim toward developing a model set of procedures. There are some states, such as Massachusetts, Utah, and Florida, that seem to have solved the problem to some degree, by having the state share in the funding on local community programs, and as a result fostered a budding cottage industry of child care providers.

In Massachusetts it is possible to visit group homes like *735 House*, which provides 14 beds, under contract to the state, for an average stay of 16 months. Residents move through a well-structured set of phases, beginning with minimal privileges and attending classes on site. The most senior residents run the house, assigning duties and punishments and insuring that everything gets done. In these settings positive peer culture is clearly working, at least to the extent that it eliminates many of the security concerns that occupy the minds of training school administrators. The Massachusetts group home network allows residents to take advantage of the excellent special education programs offered by many local school districts, without having to build a costly and educationally inferior duplicate system within the Department of Youth Services (DYS). There is absolutely no movement in Massachusetts to undo the deinstitutionalization reforms of the past 12 years.

SECURE RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES

The deep end of any juvenile correctional system must handle those youths who continually resist any and all attempts at constructive programming--the chronic runners, and gang bangers, and plain "pains in the ass." In Massachusetts they have it down to about 170 secure beds.

In California there must be 8000 kids under lock and key. At Preston they call it Tamarack Lodge. At Youth Training School in California (YTS) it is called the Recalcitrant Cottage--the hole within the hole in which youths are kept in super secure solitary confinement for purposes of temporary detention, protective custody, or as longer term punishment (90 days or more) for institutional infractions such as attacking staff. California probably has more kids in solitary confinement in "adjustment centers" than Massachusetts has secure beds. The moral of this tale of woe is--If you provide super secure custodial facilities, the staff and kids will see that they are filled. Some kids will feel duty bound to earn their way into the toughest custody the system has to offer, a badge of honor a Scarface protege is not going to miss. Of course the staff use these "adjustment cells" to temporarily solve whatever problems these youth are causing when they are out in the mainline cottages.

A complete change of scenery. Picture a bucolic country setting; rolling hills as far as the eye can see. No fences. Well-scrubbed youths engaging in strenuous work projects or organized sports. Congenial mess halls or outdoor eating arrangements in which the staff mix easily with the youths. Open displays of affection and horseplay between staff and kids mixed in with sterner commands to "check yourself" or "circle up."

What is the connection between these two scenes? Kids and cost. Both programs take the same types of kids and cost about the same to operate. However the atmosphere is entirely different. So are the attitudes and responsibility of staff and so are the managers who run them. One relies on fear and intimidation to keep individual acts of aggression and deceit to an acceptable minimum. The other uses positive peer pressure to encourage self-examination and pro-social development. One maintains its pretense of security with 12-foot high chainlink fencing, razor-wire (to make sure any kid who does scale the fence leaves a trail), and a continual succession of locked doors. The staff maintain order by controlling the doors, moving kids from dorm to dorm, and by "adding time" (to minimum eligible parole dates). The other maintains order by staying on top of what's happening and dealing with problems before they blow.

Is one of these models more successful than the other? The evidence is still limited. But a recent comparison of recidivism rates for VisionQuest, one of these staff secure programs, with those for traditional probation camps and training schools found that VisionQuest graduates were arrested 25 to 50 percent less often, following their release. Additional evidence will be provided by the results of OJJDP's Violent Juvenile Offender evaluation and RAND's evaluation of OJJDP's Private Sector Corrections Initiative. Both evaluations involve the random assignment of serious delinquents to either the staff secure experimental programs or traditional correctional programs.

So far the basic ingredients of a successful staff secure residential program appear to be: small size, committed and enthusiastic staff, supportive and skillful management, demanding physical activities, graduated phases, eclectic programming and extremely limited unstructured time. We need to know a lot more.

Given the high cost of fully supporting experimental residential programs that can cost in excess of $50,000 per youth programmed, OJJDP would do well to try and encourage or assist states or local jurisdictions who are interested in conducting their own evaluations, by providing them with the necessary analytic and research design assistance, or providing them with funding to get together and discuss their results. Eventually the motivation for identifying and utilizing the most effective methods of programming for each different type of juvenile offender must be generated at the local level. OJJDP's job should be to show how this how this can be done, collect and disseminate the findings, and support those who are making a good try.

AFTERTHOUGHTS ON AFTERCARE

The appendix to this paper contains an argument and design for an *Aftercare* experiment that is considerably more detailed than could be provided for the other issues covered in this paper, within the time allotted. Why this special attention to *Aftercare*? The choice was not random.

The failure of the current system to provide reasonable *Aftercare*, including both supervision and services, is recognized by many as the Achilles' heel of our current juvenile corrections efforts. Scholars such as LaMar Empey, who have devoted several years and much thought to improving correctional programming, have all come to realize that good residential programs are not enough, without effective *Aftercare*. The gains are too fragile. The subjects too vulnerable. The negative peer pressures in the community too great. The system has to find a way to hang in there longer after the residential treatment is complete or accept the disastrous success rate the system currently provides. *Aftercare*, my friends, is currently where it's at.

APPENDIX
AFTERCARE: ESTABLISHING PRO-SOCIAL COMMUNITY CONTACTS AND PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR

THE PROBLEM

One of the most frustrating and expensive failures of most contemporary juvenile and criminal justice systems is their consistent lack of success in reducing the future criminal behavior of chronic juvenile offenders--the 15 to 17-year-old youths with five or more prior offenses who make up the bulk of most state training school populations.

Most states now spend somewhere between $25,000 and $50,000 per year to securely house and program these youths after they have been passed through an extensive series of community-based programs before their commitment to the training school. Nevertheless, after their release more than 70 percent are usually rearrested within one year and more than 50 percent are returned to some form of secure confinement, (Greenwood and Abrahamse, 1982; Haapanen and Jesness, 1982).

These chronic juvenile offenders, who constitute less than 5 percent of the male juvenile population and less than 18 percent of all male juveniles arrested, represent more than an expensive failure for the juvenile justice system. They also represent what will eventually become the hardcore of the adult career criminal population, since "early age at first arrest," "frequency of juvenile contacts," and "confinement to a state training school" are all strong predictors of adult recidivism (Blumstein et al., 1986; Hoffman, 1983; Klein and Caggiano, 1986) and high rate offending chronic juvenile offenders are at the core of the predatory street crime problem (Blumstein et al., 1986; Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; Greenwood and Abrahamse, 1982; Visher, 1986).

OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE REASONS

Why is the success rate with these juveniles is so low? Why, in spite of our best efforts at rehabilitation and reform, do the majority continue in their anti-social and self-destructive ways?

One reason for this failure may be the inadequacies of the residential programs to which they are committed. Recent surveys of juvenile justice practices (Greenwood et al., 1983; Greenwood and Zimring, 1985; Krisberg, Litsky, and Schwartz, 1984) suggest that many states have de-emphasized rehabilitation goals in favor of incapacitation. The evidence for this trend is based on: Increased average lengths of stay (in the last ten years the California Youth Authority's average length of stay has increased from 10 to 19 months); length of stay based on commitment offense; declining staff-to-ward ratios; decreased efforts devoted to research and program experimentation; and decreased emphasis on aftercare.

A tour of the typical state training school, which is usually rundown, understaffed, and overcrowded with minority youth, cannot help but convince most observers that we could do better in providing more positive residential settings. For many states, improvements in their secure residential program are clearly the first order of business.

However, some states have developed networks of innovative and progressive residential programs in which the youth appear to be developing positive behavior patterns and respond to interviewers' questions in positive ways. Most of these programs are much smaller in size (20-40 beds) than the typical training school, which holds several hundred, and have higher staff-to-ward ratios. Yet even for these programs the failure rate is distressingly high. Among those who have studied such programs the consensus is that the continuing failure of their graduates to avoid future arrests is due to a combination of:

Inadequate family support. Most chronic offenders come from families that suffer from a variety of handicaps or deficits including: the absence of one or both biological parents; alcohol or drug abuse; criminality or mental disorders on the part of one or both parents; low income; unemployment; marital strife; inadequate or excessively harsh disciplinary practices, and an absence of expressed love and affection

(Greenwood and Zimring, 1985; Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). These families are not able to provide the kind of positive support and role modeling that young ex-offenders require upon their release. In fact, it is frequently the problems of their families that drag them back into crime or at least put them back onto the streets. LaMar Empey concluded that major failure of the Provo and Silverlake experiments was lack of attention to family therapy (Empey and Erickson, 1972; Empey and Lubeck, 1971).

Inadequate Community Programming. The typical chronic juvenile offender requires an extensive battery of community services upon his release: enrollment in a special continuation or vocational school; part- or full-time employment; drug or family counseling; medical care; and frequently temporary housing. It is not enough that such services are usually available to those who look hard enough and can tolerate the red tape it frequently takes to obtain them. The chronic offender has developed a lifetime habit of avoiding such programs or walking away before completion. Low tolerance for frustration, inability to delay gratification (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985)--the chronic juvenile offender requires a combination of advocacy and supervision in order to locate, be accepted into, and complete the community services he requires.

Ingrained patterns of anti-social behavior. Crime is not the only form of deviant or anti-social behavior that chronic juvenile offenders typically engage in--drug and alcohol abuse, failure to keep commitments and appointments, shirking of duties, denial of responsibility, sexual experimentation, truancy, association with anti-social peers, etc. The list goes on and on. Many of these are pleasures that are not available to training school inmates--hence their increased attractiveness when the youth are released. These are not tastes and habits that are easily eradicated. A residential placement may be the first step. But without strong reinforcement upon return to the community, as experience with recovering alcoholics has shown, any new steps in a positive direction are likely to be overwhelmed by prior behavioral patterns.

THE SOLUTION

The solution to the problem of the chronic juvenile offender can take one of two directions--incapacitation or rehabilitation. We can lock these youths up for increasingly long periods of time and hope that they do not do too much damage during the periods when they are out amongst us. Or, we can try and change their behavior through a combination of better residential programming and more comprehensive aftercare and supervision upon their release. A cost-effective comparison of these two strategies (incapacitation vs. rehabilitation) has shown that the rehabilitation approach must reduce the future criminal activities of chronic offenders by only about 35 percent in order to be just as effective (in terms of cost and crime reduction) as doubling the length of time they are required to serve for each conviction (Greenwood and Zimring, 1985; Rydell, 1986). The remainder of this appendix describes a strategy for pursuing the rehabilitative approach with a particular emphasis on the aftercare issue.

IDENTIFICATION OF EFFECTIVE RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS AND THEIR ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS

How should we identify effective residential programs? Ultimately our judgments should be based on an accurate assessment of their success in reducing recidivism and arrest rates. The best means of making such an assessment requires the random assignment of candidate youth among the programs to be compared. By the time that the juveniles have been recruited into the program, completed it, been followed up for a year on the street, and the data analyzed, this whole process can take up to five years. Short of a randomized experiment, we can compare similar groups of youth who are naturally assigned to different residential programs. The problem with this approach is that some programs will claim that they are getting the more difficult types of kids.

Even without waiting for long-term recidivism studies we can make judgments about the effectiveness of a program based on the performance of youths as they are about to be released. Do they behave well without supervision? Do they get along with each other? Do they have positive attitudes toward their future work and schooling? Will they discuss

their problems with the staff? These are all criteria that interested parties can use as a rough screen to distinguish programs that seem more promising from those that do not. Of course, it may turn out that the positive attitudes of youth leaving a program do not translate into lower recidivism rates when they hit the streets. Hence the need for more careful follow-up studies to verify judgments based on what are normally thought of as intermediate outcome measures.

Fifteen years ago the aim of most evaluations of rehabilitation programs was to identify particular treatment methods, such as Guided Group Interaction or Behavior Modification, that would consistently produce superior results. The more realistic perspective being adopted today assumes that the effectiveness of any program depends as much on the quality and dedication of its staff and management as it does on the particular treatment approaches they use (Greenwood and Zimring, 1985).

A number of recent or ongoing studies are beginning to shed new light on the essential ingredients for residential program success. The National Center for Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) is just completing an extensive evaluation of residential and community based programs in Utah that appears to show the ineffectiveness of traditional probation supervision and the positive effects of innovative community based residential placements (Krisberg, Austin, and Joe, 1986). URSA Institute is now completing its reports on the results of OJJDP's Violent Juvenile Offender Initiative under which five programs employed various forms of a multi-phased community reintegration model. RAND is currently conducting an evaluation of three private sector programs--NCIA (National Center on Institutions and Alternatives), in Los Angeles; RCA (RCA Services Company) in New Jersey; and New Life (New Life Youth Services) in Ohio--using a random assignment design, supported by funding from OJJDP. We have already completed a post-hoc evaluation of another private program called VisionQuest, which demonstrates that VisionQuest reduced post-release recidivism and arrest rates by more than 25 percent compared with local probation camps or the CYA.

The primary focus of further research on residential programs should be on the identification of those ingredients that appear essential for success, and on the identification of exemplary programs that can serve as the starting point for aftercare studies.

EVALUATION OF AFTERCARE PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

At this point it appears that we know much less about what it takes to provide effective aftercare than we do about residential programming, because the issue has received so little serious and systematic attention. We begin with some hypotheses about what *Aftercare* must accomplish:

- Family counseling and mediation to help the returning youth find more positive ways of interacting with other family members and to help the family deal with its many other problems;
- Educational counseling and advocacy to help the youth find and gain acceptance to an appropriate educational program, and to remain in it despite the inevitable frustrations;
- Vocational counseling and assistance in finding appropriate types of part- or full-time work, applying for jobs, and dealing with work-related problems;
- Diagnosis of other social service needs and the brokering of such appropriate community services as drug and alcohol counseling, health care, housing assistance, etc.
- Monitoring of client behavior and imposition of appropriate disciplinary responses, including temporary detention or return to residential placement for continued serious failure to perform up to program expectations.

Every program that has attempted to seriously deal with aftercare issues in the community has found it necessary to deal with these issues (for instance Massachusetts Tracking and Outreach programs, Dade County Florida's Master Counselor program, VJO, etc.). These same programs also provide us with some insight into other ingredients that an effective *Aftercare* program will require:

- Low community caseworker caseloads of not more than one to ten.
- High frequency of contact exceeding three face-to-face and five phone contacts per week.

- Skilled and dedicated staff with social service training and experience. Ex-offenders with some clean street time behind them appear to do fine.
- Skilled and attentive management that can provide intensive training and close supervision for the casework staff. Staff burnout is a constant problem.

ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED

There is more to be done than simply finding a few aftercare programs that work. Even if some such programs are found the key issues that need to be resolved include:

- The length of required supervision. Is it six months? A year? Or can it be variable at the discretion of the caseworker? (Gerald Patterson, at the Oregon Social Learning Center, has found that time-contingent parent training is more effective than using prespecified time limits.)
- The intensity of supervision required? Should it be daily? Three times a week? Or should it be contingent on behavior? Do group sessions help?
- Caseworker qualifications? Do they need specific degrees or experience? Again, Patterson found that highly trained therapists were more effective at family therapy than graduate students or regular caseworkers. Is there a limit to how long caseworkers should serve? One Massachusetts program limits their tenure to 14 months, after which they must either move up in the organization or move on to another job.
- Interaction with juvenile characteristics and experience. How does the type and form of *Aftercare* required depend on the characteristics of the youth and his prior experience, particularly his recent experience in a residential program?

These are all issues for which practitioners are now only guessing at the answers. And with caseloads of only 10 to 50 youths per agency,

they are unlikely to be able to answer these questions definitively on their own.

THE REQUIRED RESEARCH DESIGN

To begin exploring *Aftercare* issues in more depth, and to answer the questions raised above, it will be necessary to set up some experimental programs and carefully monitor their activities and results. The basic requirements for these experiments will include:

1. Equal probability (random) assignment of candidate juveniles to alternative experimental conditions and control programs. Juveniles who are eligible for the type of *Aftercare* being offered must be first assigned to a pool of *Eligibles*, and then randomly assigned by the evaluator to the alternative programs that the evaluation is attempting to compare.
2. Adequate sample sizes. In order to detect differences in program effectiveness that have policy significance it will be necessary to have at least 50 juveniles assigned to each experimental condition.
3. Monitoring of service levels and quality to document the services and supervision actually provided each youth.
4. Coding of each juvenile's personal and family characteristics, and prior record.
5. Interviews with each youth during and at least one year following release from the program to provide information on self-reported behavior, attitudes and values, and perceptions about the *Aftercare* program.
6. Collection and analysis of follow-up recidivism data at least one year after release from the program.

Any serious evaluation will require at least 3.5 years to complete.

6 months for program start-up
12 months of providing service
12 months of post-program street time
12 months to collect, code and analyze follow-up recidivism data.

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